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A DEFENSE OF DUALISM] 
Keith E. Yandell 
I argue here (in Part [[) for mind-body dualism - a dualism of substances, 
not merely of properties. I also investigate (in Part Ill) dualism's relevance 
to the question of whether one can survive the death of one's body. 
Naturally the argument occurs in a philosophical context, and (in Part l) I 
begin by making that context explicit. 
PART I: CONTEXT 
Necessity 
Standard definitions of logical necessity tell us something like this: a propo-
sition P is logically necessary if and only if not-P is correctly expressed in a 
sentence S that has a proper logical inscription whose form is Q and not-Q. 
Logically necessary truth is exposed by specifying the formally contradicto-
ry structure of its denial- by what we might call logical specification. Yet, 
since every proposition has its modalities with necessity, the proposition 
expressed by Some proposition has its modalities contingently is necessarily 
false, but fails to exhibit the requisite form. Nor is it clear exactly how to 
remedy that defect, if defect it be. So logical specification will not reveal its 
necessity (or that of other examples), and we hear talk of "broad" logical 
necessitv. 
Related to these issues is the fact that while every necessarily true propo-
sition is entailed by every other (and by every contingent proposition), it is 
false that every necessarily true proposition is strictly contradicted by the 
denial of every other necessary truth, let alone by the denial of any contin-
gent proposition.2 It is hard to see how to deal with that fact without some 
recourse to a notion of necessity broader than that provided by logically 
specifiable necessity. 
The proposition Water is H20, assuming it to correctly report an essence 
that water mind -independently possesses, is necessarily true, but Water is 
not H20 lacks contradictory structure. Similar remarks go for Water is essen-
tially H20 and Water is not essentially H2O. So logical specification will not 
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reveal their necessity, and we hear talk of "metaphysical" necessity. 
T take it that talk of broad logical necessity supposes that logical impossibili-
ty sometimes is, but sometimes is not, identifiable via logical specification. 
Roughly, sometimes semantic considerations, and sometimes discovery of 
natural essences, are required if we are to expose logical contradiction. Talk 
of metaphysical necessity tends to mean something like this: There are meta-
physically necessary propositions is understood in the context of these claims: 
(i) essentialism is true [every substance has an essence, and there are sub-
stances]; (ii) conventionalism in logic is false; (iii) propositions that correctly 
ascribe essences to substances are true with logical necessity, and (iv) not 
every logically necessary proposition is identifiable as necessary by logical 
specification. Roughly, then, insofar as our talk about substances is properly 
shaped (insofar as we get it right about what essences substances have) our 
essence-ascribing propositions will possess a logical necessity not (at least 
by current techniques) accessible to logical specification.3 Further, talk of 
metaphysical necessities is in the tradition of Aristotle's remark that the 
principle of non-contradiction is a law both of thought and of things that are 
independent of thought. Without further wandering in logical minefields, I 
shall here take the line that there are logical necessities that are, and others 
that are not, logically specifiable, and that among these are correct ascrip-
tions of essences to substances. I will use necessarily false, logically impossible, 
and is self-contradictory in such a way that propositions having these inele-
gancies need not have formally contradictory denials. 
Mental Properties 
As a rough characterization, let us say that a property Q is a mental 
property if and only if X has Q entails X is [sometimes episodically and always 
dispositionally] self-conscious. One could not implausibly suggest that being 
conscious is a mental property. It is not a mental property by my definition. 
While X is self-conscious entails X is conscious, it does not follow that from 
this that being conscious is a mental property; X is self-conscious entails X has 
only consistent properties but that does not make having only consistent proper-
ties a mental property.' 
Physical Properties 
Not every non-mental property is a physical property; being prime pre-
sumably is not a physical property, nor is having only consistent properties or 
being entailed by the axioms of modal system 55. Without pretense of precision, 
I shall refer to such properties as "abstract properties" and suggest that 
property Q is a physical property if and only if Q is neither mental nor 
abstract. On this account, X has an abstract property does not entail X is 
abstract; minds and bodies are not abstract and they all have the property 
having only consistent properties and the property not being prime. I will be as 
generous as one could reasonably ask as to what counts as a property, but 
the properties that concern me here will be properties on any plausible 
account thereof. 
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Properties and Property Instances 
Some philosophers think that there are properties (e.g., being red) and 
there are property instances (e.g., the chair's being red and the pencil's being red). 
Other philosophers do not think that there are properties above and beyond 
property instances; remove all the red property instances and there is not 
some further being red. I will be concerned here only with property instances. 
It is metaphysically necessary that (PI) Nothing exists that lacks all property 
instances or To exist is to possess some property instance; that is, X exists and for 
any property-instance Q, it is false that X has Q is necessarily false. Further, it is 
necessarily the case that (P2) No property instance fails to be a property instance 
of something. Second-order property instances characterize first-order proper-
ty instances, which in tum characterize things. The pencil's being red is a mat-
ter of a property instance characterizing one thing, the chair's being red a mat-
ter of another property instance characterizing something else. Cases of a 
property instance that characterizes nothing are cases of there not being a 
property instance. If there are any properties, as opposed to property 
instances, presumably they are abstract objects; in any case, such items will 
have property instances without being property instances themselves. 
Hereafter, I will use "property" as an abbreviation for "property instance." 
Tiny Substances 
Consider the notion of a tiny substance: X is a tiny substance iff X has proper-
ties and is not itself merely a bundle of properties. An item can be a tiny sub-
stance by existing merely momentarily. The truth of (PI) and (P2) tells us 
that (P3) If there is anything at all, then there are tiny substances.s 
Robust Substances 
Consider the notion of a robust substance: X is a robust substance iff X has 
properties, is not itself merely a bundle of properties, and (if it is temporal) remains 
the same over time and through change of nonessential properties. A robust sub-
stance is always a tiny substance (and always more than tiny), and a tiny 
substance may be a robust substance. There are alleged accounts of minds or 
bodies or states or whatever that are non-substantival in the sense of their 
truth not requiring the existence of tiny substances. But since (PI-P3) are nec-
essary truths, there are no non-necessarily-false accounts of minds or of bod-
ies (or of anything) that are non-substantival in the sense of their truth not 
requiring the existence of tiny substances, because there cannot be any such 
accounts. Any alleged account of this sort would be self-contradictory. I take 
it to be plainly true that (P4) If there are changes then there are robust substances. 
Essences 
An item has a generic essence if (i) it has one or more properties by virtue 
of which it belongs to a kind such that its not belonging to that kind would 
entail its not being the thing that it is, and (ii) it is logically possible that 
there be other things of the same kind. An item has an individual essence if 
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(i) it has one or more properties P that make it the thing it is such that its not 
having that or those properties would entail its not being the individual that 
it is, and (li) it is logically impossible that any other thing have P. My con-
cern here is with generic essences. 
Dualism and Interactionism 
It is standard fare to raise supposed difficulties for dualism by asking 
such questions as: How is something so different from the physical as is the 
non-physicalistically mental able to causally affect, or be causally affected by, 
the physical? How can what is not in space, as the non-physicalistically-men-
tal is not, affect, or be affected by, the physical, which is in space? Won't the 
connection between the mental and the physical, as well as the connection 
between the physical and the mental, be in every case simply a brute - and 
therefore unintelligible - connection? Such questions about the possibility 
of mind-body interaction express much of the core of what there is by way of 
an actual argument against mind-body dualism - an argument that goes 
something like this: 1. The only plausible version of dualism is interaction-
ism; 2. If the only plausible version of dualism is interactionism, then if dual-
ism is true, interactionism is true;' So: 3. If dualism is true, interactionism is 
true; 4. If interactionism is true, then there are causal effects of the mental on 
the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental; So: 5. If dualism 
is true, then there are causal effects of the mental on the physical and causal 
effects of the physical on the mental; 6. That there are causal effects of the 
mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the mental is 
unthinkable; 7. What is unthinkable is false; So: 8. That there are causal 
effects of the mental on the physical and causal effects of the physical on the 
mental is false; So: 9. Dualism is false. 
"Unthinkable" here may just ultimately mean "is not compatible with 
physicalism" in which case it will be hard to see why a dualist should either 
disagree or regard this as a criticism, but penultimately at any rate presum-
ably it means something like "violates some at least putative necessary 
truth." Major candidates seem to be Like can only affect like, What is in space can 
only be affected by what is in space, and Ultimate connections cannot be brute. We 
will look at these in tum. 
Like can only affect like 
There is no sense of "like" in which the principle "Like can only affect 
like" is true and in which excitation of retinal cones produces color sensa-
tions, imbalance of ear fluids gives rise to vertigo, viruses cause viral dis-
eases and bacteria cause bacterial diseases, the big bang produces massive 
mass emigration, etc. The principle either disallows such cases as stubbing 
one's toe causing pain, recognizing an oncoming truck yielding terror, and 
noting an error in reasoning leading to an onscreen correction in the manu-
script, or else simply legislates that in order to occur they must be physical-
physical. The so-called "Causal likeness principle" (If A causes Q in B, then A 
must itself have Q) on which causality is viewed on the old pass-along-the-
bucket fire brigade model survives in contemporary philosophy only as a 
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way of criticizing interactionism. Since this principle is false, it should sur-
vive no longer, and anyone should be ashamed for basing criticisms of any-
thing on it. 
Logically Possible Knowledge of Abstracta 
Friends of abstracta typicaIIy hold the metaphysical doctrine that the 
existence of abstracta provides the truth conditions for necessary truths and 
the epistemological doctrine that awareness of abstracta is somehow 
involved in our knowledge of such truths. The metaphysical view's truth is 
a necessary condition of the truth of the epistemological view, and since the 
view that persons are abstract objects has as little favor among friends of 
abstracta as elsewhere, this involves a doctrine of contact of some sort 
between non-abstract minds, however concretely construed, and abstracta. 
It seems plain that this view is not self-contradictory and is not a disguised 
twin of "Plutins plonk parastics." If the epistemological thesis in question is 
neither necessarily false nor gibberish, then the causal likeness principle, 
presumably necessarily true if true at all, is false (and hence necessarily 
false). Thus it is no real danger to anything or anyone except those who 
appeal to it to refute mind-body dualism. 
What is in space can only be affected by what is in space 
The contradiction in propositions properly expressed by sentences of the 
form (A) A, which is non-spatial, causally affects spatial B and (B) Spatial B 
causally affects A, which is nOll-spatial is not formal; these are not Q alld not-Q 
affairs. Nor, I suggest, are they like Ralph has drawn a rectangle but Ralph has 
not drawn a figure or Propositions have their modalities only contingently which 
are necessarily false but not, so to say, syntactically so. So what, exactly, is 
wrong with (A) and (B) save that they associate with interactionist friends? 
Ultimate connections cannot be brute 
Presumably, on any account of what Law L2 reduces to law L1 means, it 
will be false that every law L such that L relates instances of one physical 
sort to instances of another physical sort is reducible to still another physical 
law; presumably the proposition L is an irreducible physical law is neither self-
contradictory nor false of all laws. Let L * be an irreducible physical law and 
let kl-phenomena and k2-phenomena be the sorts of physical items L * con-
nects. Its connection of them will be irreducible, hence brute, hence 
"unthinkable." So what? The alternative is simply denying that there are 
any physical laws. Is that, particularly for a materialist, not "unthinkable"? 
It is not at all clear, physicalist prejudices aside, why brute mental-physical 
or physical-mental connections should be objectionable because they are 
brute, whereas brute physical-physical connections are not objectionable.7 
There is an interesting version of the cosmological argument whose first 
premise is If it is logically possible that there is an explanation of a true, logically 
contingent existential statement, then there is an explanation of its truth. In its 
three-by-five card version it continues by claiming That there is a world is a 
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possibly explicable, true, logically contingent existential statement; after all, it is 
logically possible that there not be a physical world (or a physical world plus 
finite minds). It then properly draws the conclusion that That there is a world 
has an explanation and rightly notes that there being a worLd is what is up for 
explanation and so cannot be any part of the explanation required. It then 
concludes that there being a world has an explanation that refers to something 
that is not the physical world (or the physical world plus finite minds). From 
there it is abstract objects or God, and abstract objects don't act. 
Whatever the merits of the argument (they would have to be addressed 
after the argument was put carefully rather than caricatured as it has been 
here), its first premise rejects brute facts.s It will explanatorily rest only with 
what so exists that its existence is logically impossible to explain. The accep-
tance of this premise would explain physicalist enmity to brute facts, 
though I am not aware that it is used as a rationale in that way. The 
premise is, I suspect, incompatible with physicalism. 
A Conclusion Concernillg Interactionism 
I suspect, then, that the argument against interactionism, and hence 
against dualism, more draws psychological support from the current 
philosophical culture than philosophical sustenance from sound and 
valid arguments. At any rate, the sorts of considerations that we have 
noted, while common enough in criticism of mind-body dualism, have 
little to commend them. 
PART II: MIND-BODY DUALISM 
Substance Dualism 
If one holds property dualism, it does not follow that one embraces sub-
stance dualism. Substance dualism, I take it, is the view that mental proper-
ties are kind-defining and physical properties are kind-defining, that there 
are things of each kind so defined, and that for any item A that belongs to 
the kind mental substance and any item B that belongs to the kind physimL 
substance, it is logically possible that A exist and B not exist. (Presumably it 
is also possible that B exist and A not exist, but I will not pursue that here.) 
A monotheistic dualist will restrict the range of "A" and "B" to mental sub-
stances other than God. Standardly, essentialists hold that no one noncom-
posite thing can have more than one essence. This, plus the view that having 
physical properties and having mental properties define essences, leads to the 
view that human persons are substantivally composite. 
Materials for ModaL Arguments 
Let X range over only noncomposite substances. Let W be an existence-
entailed property if and only if, for any substance X, X exists entails X has W; 
having properties, having only consistent properties, and being self-identical are 
existence-entailed properties. Let a property be a kind-defining and deep dif-
ference making property if and only if it is not an existence-entailed property, 
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defines a kind, and something's having it is necessary to that thing's exist-
ing at all as well as to its having the sorts of causal powers and passivities 
it has. Then let Q range over only kind-defining and deep difference mak-
ing properties and consider these forms of statements: 1. It is possible that 
some X have Ql and lack Q2; 2. It is possible that some X have Q2 and lack 
Ql; 3. It is not possible, relative to any X, that both X has Ql and X has Q2 
are true; [and, to be explicit if redundant] 4. JIaving Ql and having Q2 are 
kind-defining, deep difference making properties. Consider also these 
forms of statements: 5. It is possible that I exist and lack Ql; 6. Having Ql is 
not essential to me; 7. Having Q2 is essential to me; 8. It is not possible that I 
exist and lack Q2. No essentialist can consistently embrace 5. and deny 6., 
or accept 7. and deny 8. From such materials as these, modal arguments for 
dualisms are built. 
Modal Arguments and Dualisms 
Standard arguments for property dualism and substance dualism appeal 
to modal arguments. Let # mean It is logically possible that. Also let MP range 
over some particular mental property, PP over any physical property, MS 
over some particular mental substance, and PS over any physical substance. 
The arguments typically and understandably focus on those physical prop-
erties with which the mental property in question might be thought to be 
identical and those physical substances with which the mental substance in 
question might be thought to be identical. The standard arguments have 
these forms: 
Modal Argument for Property Dualism 
1. #MP exists and PP does not exist; 2. If #MP exists and PP does not exist 
then MP is not identical to PP; So: 3. MP is not identical to PP. 
Modal Argument for Substance Dualism 
4. #MS exists and PS does not exist; 5. If #MS exists and PS does not 
exist then MS is not identical to PS. So: 6. MS is not identical to PS. 
For our purposes, the relevant substitutions regarding properties are: 
7. #1 am self-conscious and I have no bodily states. 
8. If #1 am self-conscious and I have no bodily states then My being self-
consciolls is not identiml to my having bodily states. So: 
9. My being self-conscious is not identical to my having bodily states. 
The relevant substitutions regarding substances are: 
10. #1 exist IlS a self-conscious beiJ1g and 1 have no body. 
11. If #1 exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body then My existing 
as a self-consciolls being is not identical to my having a body. So: 
12. My existing as a self-conscious being is not identical to my having a 
body. 
This gives us a rough map of the conceptual neighborhood for modal argu-
ments for mind-body dualism. It remains to be seen whether sound and 
valid arguments for dualism can be found there. (The particular arguments 
just noted are problematic.) 
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The Scientific Realist Objection 
One objection to the possible success of such arguments is the scientific 
realist objection. Having used # for It is logically possible that let us use * for 
the very different notion It is epistemically possible that which amounts to 
something like For all we know, it may be true that. Goldbach's Conjecture pre-
sumably is either true or false, if true then necessarily true, and if false then 
necessarily false. Of the propositions #Goldbach's Conjecture is true and the 
proposition #Goldbach's Conjecture is false, one is necessarily true and one is 
necessarily false. But neither of the propositions *Goldbach's Conjecture is tme 
and *Goldbach's Conjecture is false is false. The Scientific Realist Objection 
goes as follows. The property dualist argument requires that we know that 
7. #l am self-conscious and I have no bodily states. But we do not know that 7. 
unless we can eliminate: 7 A *1 cannot be self-conscious and have no central ner-
vous system states. But we cannot eliminate 7 A since someone may discover 
that the essence of being self-conscious is being in bodily state CS (where "CS" 
is defined physically) just as someone discovered that the essence of being 
water is being H2O. Similarly, the substance dualist argument requires that 
we know 10. #1 exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body. But we do not 
know that 10. unless we can eliminate: lOA *1 cannot exist as a self-conscious 
being and have no body. But we cannot eliminate lOA since someone might 
discover that the essence of being a self-conscious being is being a body of CS 
type (where "CS" is defined physically) just as someone discovered that the 
essence of being water is being H20. 
The objection mistakenly ignores crucial differences between the relevant 
cases. The Water is H20 case (assuming for the sake of the argument that the 
standard scientific realist account is correct) is that of a deep structure essen-
tial property, being H20, underlying and explaining such directly experi-
enced features as feeling wet, possessing buoyancy, and the like. In the case of 
being self-conscious, it is the directly experienced property itself that is essen-
tial. The point can be made in what is by now canonical form. For any physi-
cal feature F, were we to discover that some Twin Earth being had F but 
lacked the phenomenological feature we refer to as being self-aware, F would 
not be identical on Twin Earth to self-awareness, no matter what physical 
feature F was. The argument for property dualism, then, cannot be undercut 
by appeals to alleged discoveries of physical deep structures regarding prop-
erties. Exactly similar considerations apply to the argument for substance 
dualism. It is the phenomenologically accessible property having self-con-
sciousness that is an essential property of mine, whatever the related physical 
features may be. For any physical substance on Twin Earth, if it lacked that 
phenomenologically accessible property, then it would belong to a different 
kind than I do, no matter how similar our physical makeup; in the absence of 
the phenomenological feature having self-consciousness it will not be a person. 
So the scientific realist criticism of substance dualism also fails. 
The modal arguments for property and substance dualism require that 
there be necessary truths that are not logically specifiable.9 They also require 
that reflection on logical possibilities together with introspection sometimes 
be sufficient to establish that a property is of one kind rather than another 
and to reveal that a substance has a non-physical essence. This is, of course, a 
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far cry from the stark empiricism for which all necessity was conventional, 
tautological, and empty of fact and for which only sensory observation (plus 
inference from what sensory observation justified) established anything. 
Given that this position is notoriously self-defeating, that a view is incompat-
ible with it is hardly much of a criticism. The modal arguments require that 
there be essences - at least, those of persons - that are not discernible by 
physics (or physiology, chemistry, etc.); notoriously, physicalists deny this. 
But their denial is part of their physicalism, and presumably should be a 
derivative part thereof - a part for which there are good arguments that do 
not require the truth of physicalism as a premise. While of course the issues 
are complex, I think that it is far more clearly true that Necessarily, if X is a per-
son then X is self-conscious than it is true either that For any item X and essence 
E, if X has E then the only way in which it is discoverable that X has E is by some 
natural science procedure or For any item X, if X exists, then X is physical. Even if 
For any physical item X and essence E, if X has E then the only way in which it is 
discoverable that physical X has E is by some natural science procedure this will 
not, by itself, provide any problem for dualist modal arguments. 
The Irrelevance of Imagination 
No argument offered here requires that we infer from images, or from 
the ways in which we can or cannot combine images, that the relevant 
modal claims are true. Imagination, in the sense of imaging, reflecting on 
images, or putting labels on images, is entirely irrelevant. To suggest other-
wise is either confused or disingenuous. 
Mistaken Modal Arguments 
There are plenty of modal arguments that are invalid. Perhaps the most 
famous is: Necessarily, P entails Q; P; hence Necessarily, Q. For any logically 
contingent proposition P, the argument Possibly P, so P is obviously invalid. 
In contrast, the argument forms Possibly possibly P, so possibly P,Possibly nec-
essarily P, so necessarily P, Possibly P is contingent, so P is contingent, and 
Possibly necessarily not P, so necessarily not P are perfectly valid. Consider an 
argument parallel to one for property dualism: 
Pl. #1 am charitable and the state described in 1st Corinthians 13 does 
not exist. 
P2. If #1 am charitable and the state described in 1 st Corinthians 13 does 
not exist then Being charitable is not identical to the state described 
in 1st Corinthians 13. So: 
P3. Being charitable is not identical to the state described in 1st 
Corinthians 13. 
Since P3. is false, one of Pl. and P2. must be false. Since it is possible that 
charity is not the quality under discussion in 1 Corinthians 13 presumably 
Pl. is true. But then P2. is false. 
Consider two arguments parallel to some arguments for substance dualism: 
P4. #1 exist and no plumbers exist. 
P5. If #1 exist and no plumbers exist then I am not identical to some 
plumber. So: 
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P6. 1 am not identical to some plumber. 
But suppose that P6A. 1 am a plumber is true. Since P6A. is contingent, the 
conjunct P4. and P6A. is consistent. P6A. entails the denial of P6., and (thus) 
so does P4. and P6A. 
But then the P4.-P6. argument is invalid. If it is invalid, then P5. is false; 
so P5. is false. From P4. and P5. it follows neither that P6B. It is not possible 
that I am identical to some plumber nor P6. I am not identical to some plumber. 
Consider the argument: 
P8. #1 exist and no philosophy professors exist. 
P9. If #1 exist and no philosophy professors exist then 1 am not identical 
to some philosophy professor. So: 
Pl0. 1 am not identical to some philosophy professor. 
The problem here is that PlO. is false, so that at least one of P8. and P9. must 
be false. Since I would still exist even if I lost my job, presumably P8. is true. 
So P9. is false. Thus these arguments, similar to some modal arguments for 
dualism, fail. 
These arguments, nonetheless, are of interest for two reasons. Consider 
the following replacements: 
(a) For P2. substitute: P2*. If #l am charitable and the state described in 1st 
Corinthians 13 does not exist then Being the state described in 1st 
Corinthians 13 is not an essential feature of charity. 
(b) for P5. substitute P5*. If #1 exist and no plumbers exist then It is no 
part of my essence to be a plumber. 
(c) For P9. substitute P9*. If #l exist and no philosophy professors exist 
then It is no part of my essence to be a philosophy professor. 
Note, first, that these new premises, together with the original first premis-
es, establish true negative conclusions regarding essences. It is not a neces-
sary feature of the property being charitable to be referred to in the famous 
Pauline chapter nor is it any part of my essence to be either a plumber or a 
philosophy professor. That these conclusions are hardly earthshaking is 
nothing against the soundness or validity of the arguments that lead to 
them. Note, second, that they appeal to nothing but ret1ection. 
Some Nonmistaken Modal Arguments (?) 
Consider this argument relevant to property dualism: 
Argument One 
POL #1 am self-conscious and I have no bodily states. 
P02. If #1 am self-conscious and I have no bodily states then My 
having bodily states is not essential to my being self-conscious. 
So: 
POc. My having bodily states is not essential to my being self-con-
scious. 
This argument seems as secure as the revised arguments about charity, 
plumbers, and philosophy professors. lO 
Consider this argument relevant to substance dualism in which the 
notion of a body is the notion of any physical substance, soft or hard: 
Argument Two 
501. #l exist as a self-conscious being and 1 have no body. 
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502. If #1 exist as a self-conscious being and I have no body then My having a 
body is not essential to my existing as a self-conscious being. So: 
SOC. My having a body is not essential to my existing as a self-conscious 
being. 
This negative argument too seems correct. If POCo and SOc. are true, then 
neither being self-conscious nor self-conscious beings are essentially physical. 
That, however, is not yet property or substance dualism. 
Substance Dualism 
Consider this argument for a positive property dualistic conclusion: 
Argument Three 
01. #There is a property instance of being self-conscious and there is no prop-
erty instance of any physical property. 
02. If #There is a property instance of being self-conscious and there is no 
property instance of any physical property then a property instance of 
being self-conscious does not have being a physical property as its 
essence. So: 
03. A property instance of being self-conscious does not have being a physi-
cal property as its essence. ll 
Consider this positive argument for substance dualism: 
Argument Four 
04. It is not #1 exist and 1 am not a self-conscious being. 
05. Being a self-conscious being is not an existence-entailed property. 
06. If it is not #1 exist and I am not a self-conscious being and being a self-
conscious being is not an existence-entailed property, then it is (at 
least part of) my essence to be a self-conscious being. So: 
07. It is (at least part oj) my essence to be a self-conscious being. 
Next, consider Argument Five: 
08. It is not #1 exist and my self-consciousness does not exist. 12 
09. It is not #My self-consciousness exists and I do /lot exist. 
010. If it is not #l exist and my self-consciousness does not exist and it is 
not #My self-consciousness exists and I do not exist then the existence 
of my self-consciousness is necessary and sufficient for my exis-
tence. 
011. The existence of my self-consciousness is necessary and suffi-
cient for my existence. 
012. If the existence of my self-consciousness is necessary and suffi-
cient for my existence, then my essence includes nothing other 
than my being self-conscious. 
013. My essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious. 
(Note that OIl. does not say anything about whether the existence of my 
self-consciousness does, or does not, itself depend on something other than 
itself, as of course it does.) Next, consider: 
Argument Six 
014. If my essence includes nothing other than my being self-con-
scious, and my having a body is not essential to my existing as a 
self-conscious being, then it is no part of my essence to have a 
body. So: 
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015. It is no part of my essence to have a body. 
016. If it is no part of my essence to have a body, then it is no part of 
my essence to have any property the possession of which requires 
that I have a body. So: 
017. It is no part of my essence to have any property the possession 
of which requires that I have a body. 
018. For any physical property Q, my possessing Q requires that I 
have a body. So: 
019. It is no part of my essence to have any physical property. 
020. If it is no part of my essence to have any physical property and 
my essence includes nothing other than my being self-conscious, 
then my being self-conscious is not a physical property. So: 
021. My being self-conscious is not a physical property. 
These arguments, too, at least seem to escape the modal problems noted 
above. They bring us at least to the brink of mind-body dualism, for if we 
begin by granting that there are physical substances, show that there are 
substances whose essence is to have self-consciousness, and show that being 
self-conscious is not a physical property, then if being selrconscious is a mental 
property, there are mental substances. 
Being mental as intrinsic, neither topic neutral or role-defined. 
The dualist must insist that being self-conscious is an introspectible, intrin-
sically phenomenological feature not reducible to anything like a state that 
fulfills role R where R is causally defined. It is not a topic-neutral feature and 
not reducible to any other feature. Its being so goes deeply against a variety 
of currently highly popular assumptions and research programs.13 Roughly, 
to usefully prove that P is to deduce P from something more clearly true, or 
else to so elicit P's meaning that its truth shines through. And, as is typical-
ly the case for fundamental claims, perhaps the best the mind-body dualist 
can do here, having nothing more fundamental to which to appeal, is to cri-
tique accounts of being self-conscious on which it is not a mental property. 
This task is nothing like hopeless. Materialists themselves seem quite ha.ppy 
to provide powerful criticisms of every variety of materialism save the 
bra.nd that they themselves favor. Alternatively, of course, the mind-body 
dualist may assert that If item X is mental then item X is essentially mental. If 
this is so, then functionalism is not even possibly true.'" 
P ART III: DUALISM AND EXISTENTIAL SECURITY 
Even if the property dualism and substance dualism arguments entirely 
succeed, it may still be true that: 
Ml. For any mental property Ql, there is some physical property Q2 
such that if Q2 does not obtain, neither does Ql. 
M2. For any mental substance M, there is some physical substance P 
such that if P does not exist, neither does M. 
Nothing in the modal arguments for property and substance dualism dis-
cussed here is sufficient to prove that mental substances do not (or do) 
depend for their existence on physical substances. Nothing in them, for 
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example, proves that M3. If property Q is not essential to X, then X's existence 
does not in fact depmd on X's having Q, even though it is logically possible that it 
not so depend or that M4. If X is distinct from Y, then X's existence does not in fact 
depend upon y's existence, even though it is logically possible that it not so depend 
- not even where one restricts X and Y to referring to non-divine things. 
As Descartes reluctantly granted, the truth of dualism does not entail that 
the soul survives the death of the body, but only that its doing so is not logi-
cally impossible. Dualism without monotheism arguably leaves the claim 
that human persons survive death unsupported. 
Survival and Mind-body Physicalism 
What, then, is the significance of the truth of mind-body dualism, if it is 
true, for the issue of human survival? More than might appear from the 
previous section. On a physicalist account of persons, persons are either 
bodies or bundles of physical states (and/ or properties). On neither sort of 
physicalism does survival seem promising. 
Hlmdle Physicalism and Survival 
Consider the sort of physicalism for which a person is a set of psycholog-
ical states and / or dispositional states or processes, each of which is momen-
tary. These states will include sensations, beliefs, preferences, desires, and 
the like, as well as tendencies to believe, desire, prefer, and so on. Let any 
particular set of such states that co-exist at some time be a momentary psycho-
logical bundle or MPH." On this view, a particular person at a given time is 
one of the MPBs that exist at that time, and over time a particular person is a 
causally linked series of successive bundles. '6 
Consider the following scenario. Mary, a particular MPB, enters a trans-
mission device that supposedly will beam her to Mars. The device misfires, 
sending one "Mary" to Venus and another "Mary" to Cleveland. Each new 
"Mary" is exactly as like the old Mary as the other, so each has equal claim 
to being her. Since "new Maryl" is not identical to "new Mary2," the old 
Mary cannot be identical to both new "Marys." The metaphysical identity 
conditions of an item are those features thereof that make it the item it is 
and not another; the epistemological identity conditions of an item are those 
features of an item that allow us to identify it as the item that it is. The rele-
vant metaphysical features mayor may not coincide with the relevant epis-
temological features. It is only metaphysical identity conditions that concern 
us here. 17 If Mary, on entry into the device, just is an MPB, and each new 
"Mary" is an MPB that is related in some tight causal connection to the in-
the-device MPB - however it is that MPB's allegedly get strung together in 
a person-making series - then each new "Mary" is (epistemology aside) 
metaphysically as much of a new Mary as any Mary that would have come 
to be had Mary entirely avoided transmission devices. 
It seems to me plainly a necessary truth that: 
(N) If person S exists at time T, then there are no possible conditions 
under which the coexistence with S of something just like S 
would have prevented S existing at T. 
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But while (on the bundle account) Mary would have existed on Mars had 
there not also been a "Mary" in Cleveland, or in Cleveland had there not 
been a "Mary" on Mars, the existence of two "Marys" (so to say) prevents 
Mary from enjoying a post-transmission existence. There is (on the bundle 
view) no fact of the matter regarding Mary's survival. But then Mary sur-
vives is not tme (or false), and if Mary survives is not tme (or false) then 
Mary does not survive. Her hopes of space traveling go unfulfilled. So, on 
the bundle account, N. is false. Hence the bundle account is false. 
An anti-dualistic argument runs: such cases as the Mary case are logical-
ly possible; in them, there is no matter of fact about whether Mary has sur-
vived or not; were dualism tme, there would be a fact of the matter in these 
possible cases; so dualism is false. Of course the dualist has a response: I do 
exist now. Necessarily, either I will exist a moment hence, or I will not. 
Were there nothing more to me than MPBs, it could be false that either I will 
exist a moment hence or not. So it is false that there is nothing more to me 
that MPBs. Either I will exist a moment hence, or I will not is a necessary truth; 
so any view on which it is not tme is necessarily false. So the MPB-and-
nothing-more view of persons is necessarily false. The anti-dualist argu-
ment and its response indicates at least part of the point of the view that 
persons are simple. Simple in this sense can, I think, be defined as follows. 
An item X has a particular part if any only if X belongs to kind K, X has 
parts, and at least one of X's parts also belongs to K. What we might call the 
personalistic simplicity thesis -that Necessarily, if X is a person t!zen X is simple 
entails Necessarily, if X is a person then X has no particular parts. Has no particu-
lar parts is to be read strictly; it entails both has no simultaneous particulaJ" parts 
and has no successive particular parts. The MPB account of persons supposes 
that persons have successive particular parts, as the view that there is one 
cosmic mind of which each finite mind is a part supposes that the cosmic 
mind has simultaneous as well as successive particular parts. Both violate 
the personalistic simplicity thesis. Mind-body dualism typically, and per-
haps necessarily, embraces it. The personalistic simplicity thesis typically, 
and perhaps necessarily, is part of monotheism, and in its application to 
God is to be distinguished from the view that ascribes a rather more dubi-
ous simplicity to God. 
Substance Physicalism and Survival 
Suppose that I am (identical to) a body B at time T-1, that I do not exist 
(i.e., on the view just assumed, am not identical to any body) at time 1', and 
am "reconstituted" (i.e., B's twin is created) at time T + 1.18 On such a view, 
it is possible that two "B-twins" X and Y be created (twin with respect to 
whatever is supposed to make a single B-twin me again). Should this hap-
pen, there would then be no fact of the matter about my (re)existence or sur-
vival at T +1. After all, X is not numericallv identical to Y, and so I cannot be 
identical to both X and Y. If there is no fa~t of the matter about my survival, 
then it is not tme that I survive. So, on the reconstitution view, there are 
possible conditions under which the coexistence at some time with (what 
would otherwise have been) me of something just like me would prevent 
my existing. On the reconstitution view, then, N. is false. Hence the recon-
562 A DEFENSE OF DUALISM 
stitution view is false; a substance physicalist who thinks we survive must 
suppose that our bodies exist continuously. (Similar remarks apply if what 
is supposedly reconstituted is a mental rather than a physical substance.) 
Very familiar evidence suggests that the fate of any human person's 
body is inelegant. It is logically possible that when, say, St. Paul died, God 
secretly removed his body to a heavenly freezer and replaced it by a copy 
which is what was buried. One could hold that st. Paul really is a hard, tiny 
physical pellet that is indestmctible by any natural process. But these views 
are neither exegetically nor theologically, let alone philosophically, the sort 
of thing one would think of holding save under enormous conceptual 
duress. If they are what one is left with if one wants to hold both that per-
sons are essentially physical and that persons survive death, one might 
understandably wonder if one or the other of those beliefs is false. 
Conclusion 
Mind-body dualism leaves open the question as to whether human per-
sons survive death, and if dualism is tme, then it is both possible that God 
cause persons to survive and unproblematically compatible with what we 
know the fate of human bodies to be that God causes persons to survive. 
Reconstitution, body snatching, and pellet theories are unnecessary. That is 
not, of course, an argument for dualism, but a consequence of dualism of 
interest to many monotheists - a consequence perhaps not had by any 
other view of the essence of persons. 
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Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
2. For some discussion of this, see the final chapter of the present author's 
The Epistemology of Religion Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994). 
3. We could redefine "water" so as to make "Water is not H20" equivalent 
to "Water is not water," but while the necessity that essentialistic scientific real-
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ism ascribes to water's being H20 would be reflected in the structure of the 
denial of (redefined) "Water is H20," the proximate ground of the necessity 
would be in a real definition and the ultimate ground of the necessity would lie 
in the nature of water itself. 
4. If one insists that mental properties come in two basic kinds, one entail-
ing self-consciousness, and the other of that kind if and only if X has Q entails X 
is conscious but does not entail X is self-conscious, I will not argue. If both kinds of 
mental properties are kind-defining, it will follow that self-conscious beings are 
of a different kind than conscious-but-not-self-conscious beings. The issue likely 
to be of interest here concerns the ontological status of non-human animals. 
While that is an interesting and important issue, it is not the one I am concerned 
with here. 
5. For a description and critique of Hume's argument that there are (and 
can be) only tiny substances, d. the present author's "Continuity, 
Consciousness and Identity in Hume's Philosophy," Hume Studies, Vol. XVIII, 
No.2, Nov., 1992, pp. 255-274. 
6. It is false that it follows from Pl's being the most plausible version of 
theory T that if T is true, then Pl is true, and were the argument in which 
premise 2. appears otherwise in order, it would require revision here. Since it is 
not otherwise in order, I will not worry about providing that revision. 
7. Berkeley offered one's ability to create mental images - e.g., to day-
dream about being at the beach or, with our eyes closed, to picture our living 
rooms - as a nonphysical model for understanding God's creation of the world 
ex nihilo. In any case, it is tme that (i) models themselves are understandable 
only by reference to data whose intelligibility is borrowed by, and not depen-
dent on, the model, and (ii) there are cases of physical-mental and mental-phys-
ical causality that are intelligible without models and whose intelligibility can 
be borrowed by models. Hence (a) the intelligibility of causal claims cannot uni-
versally rest on our having models for them, and (b) it is arbitrary (as well as 
false) to think that all causal models must be physical-physical. 
8. Strictly, it rejects brute existential facts - those properly recorded via 
assertions with such forms are Therr is an X or Thrre arr X and Y. 
9. Or else real definitions; d. note 4 above. 
10. Appeal is often made here to the necessary identity doctrine that If A is 
identical to B then A is necessarily identical to B. If this doctrine is true, then it fol-
lows straight off that if it is possible that I exist and have no body, then I cannot 
be identical to any body. We shall then need a circumspect way of putting the 
necessary identity doctrine - perhaps in one version about properties and in 
another about substances. One will be a doctrine about possible relations 
among properties and the other a doctrine about possible relations among 
things - neither can be a doctrine about relations among terms and terms or 
among terms and things. The property doctrine perhaps will be something like 
the conjunct of these claims: POI. If property Ql can be instantiated in X with-
out property Q2 being instantiated in X, then Ql is a different property than Q2; 
P02. If property Ql is identical to property Q2 then necessarily property Ql is 
identical to property Q2; P03. If necessarily property Ql is identical to property 
Q2, then there is no possible world in which one of them is instantiated and the 
other is not. The substance doctrine perhaps will be something like the conjunct 
of these claims: 501. If substance M can exist without substance S existing, then 
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M is a different substance than S; 502. If substance M is identical to substance S 
then necessarily substance M is identical to substance S; 503. If necessarily sub-
stance M is identical to substance S then there is no possible world graced with 
M and not with 5 or graced with S but not with M. 
11. The temptation here is to argue: D3a. Any property that does not have 
being a physical property as its essence is not a physical property; So: 03b. Being 
self-conscious is not a physical property. But D3a. presupposes that being self-con-
scious, lacking being a physical property as its essence, cannot be physically 
instanced. Functionalism's varieties deny that presupposition. Functionalism 
requires that the essence of the mental is to be role defined and that anything, 
physical or not, that plays the right sort of (causal) role is mental in nature. It 
seems to me that being self-conscious is to be phenomenologically understood; its 
nature is intrinsic, not role-defined. Functionalism, in effect, makes being self-
conscious a topic neutral property, which seems to me necessarily false of being 
self-conscious. But I will not insist on D3a. here, and will return below to the 
issue that it raises. 
12. Reference to my self-consciousness is not problematic here; plainly "my 
self-consciousness" has a different referent than "self-consciousness in general" 
(which has no referent unless it is understood as "individual self-consciousness-
es, collectively considered") or "someone else's self-consciousness," and its ref-
erent is the one required to make the premise true. The premise should be 
understood Cartesianly: what I am identical to at time T is a particular mental 
substance - a particular thing that has being self-conscious as its essence. While 
the premise stated is true, parallel claims in which "my self-consciousness" is 
replaced by, say, "my right hand," "my minivan." or "my body" are not true. 
13. This is very different from having been refuted or even having been sub-
jected to impressive critique. I have not tried here to discuss "the nature of the 
mental" - to deal with propositional attitudes and intentionality, let alone such 
(I believe) less central issues as privacy and alleged incorrigibility. There are 
myriad physicalistic and topic-neutral analyses of these notions. There is also 
the move of giving up on any such analysis and simply fiating that these 
notions have no purchase on reality. Useful perspective on these matters is 
given in Chapter Twelve of The PhilosophicaL Papers of Alan Donagan (ed. J.E. 
Malpas; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1994) and Donagan's Choice: The Essential 
Element in Human Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987). There is 
also the suggestion that since the evolutionary process has not prepared us for 
dealing with hard metaphysical problems, we cannot expect to have any suc-
cessful physicalistic or topic-neutral accounts but this fact should not make us 
suspicious of physicalism (a move analogous to Freudians inviting their critics 
to the psychoanalytic couch). Apparently, appeals to mystery are not limited to 
religion. 
14. Cf. the remarks in footnote 10. 
15. Notoriously, there are problems about what distinguishes one MPB at 
time T from another MPB at T. 
16. There are various difficulties with of an MPB view of personal identity. 
Note its apparent entailments regarding memory and morality. On an MrB 
view of things, a person is a collection of MPBs at one moment and another col-
lection at another, membership in a series being constitutive of being a person 
over time. Series membership, in turn, is causally constituted; a series is formed 
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when one collection gives causal rise to another, and that to another. Consider 
what memory presumably amounts to on this view. At one moment, in collec-
tion Cl, a state obtains. At a later moment, in collection C17, another state 
obtains that represents the first state's having obtained and is caused by the 
state that it represents (indirectly, of course; the Cl state is long gone by the time 
C17 puts in an appearance). A state just like C17 but not caused by Cl, or a state 
just like C17 and caused by Cl but occurring in a different series than the one 
that Cl occurred in - perhaps a state caused by hearing the Cl-series person 
describe Cl by an especially apt representor - will not be a memory state rela-
tive to Cl. (This entails that "same series" cannot be defined in terms of memory 
states, since nothing is a memory state that is not in the same series as the state 
that caused it and that it represents.) Consider also the account of moral respon-
sibility that the MPB account offers. Actions are performed at times. Without 
worrying here about how temporally minimal a collection must be - about, so 
to speak, how long a single moment is- suppose that a bundle or collection Cx 
performs a wrong action that is punished. It will be a different collection - say, 
Cy - that is punished for doing what Cx did. If Cx performs an action" then Cx 
is a person, and (on the relevant doctrines) Cy as recipient of punishment is also 
a person. Collections are persons in one sense of "person" - person(l), let us 
say. But if Cy is properly the recipient of punishment for Cx's deed, then Cy 
must be a later collection in the same series as that to which Cx belongs. A series 
of collections is a person in a second sense - say, pcrsol1(2!. A pcrson(l) is a 
momentary being - a tiny substance that is not robust. A pcr50n(2) is not a 
momentary being and is not a robust substance; it is a series of momentary 
beings, a sequence of tiny substances, each tiny substance being numerically 
distinct from each other. Memory, then, on a MPB account is a matter of a state 
in a later pcrson(]) being caused by an earlier person(l) who no longer exists. 
Responsibility, reward, and punishment are matters of a later pcrson(]) being 
responsible, rewarded, or punished for what an earlier person(l) did. What justi-
fies calling this memory or responsibility (if anything does) is simply that the 
later person(l)) is in the same causal series as the earlier person(l); numerical 
identity among earlier and later pcrsons(1) is impossible. A person(2) "acts" only 
in the sense that its constitutive persons(l) act. A person(2) is nothing more nor 
less than one person(l) after another, each caused by its predecessor. At any 
given time, there are no persons(2) save insofar as there are persons(l) who had 
causal ancestors. To say that there are persolls(2) is only to say that persons(l) 
causally succeed one another. Hence it is logically impossible that a person(2) at 
time T be identical, in whole or part, with a per50n(2) at tirne T 1 or with a per-
50n(2) at T +1; all that exists of a per50n(2) at time T is a persol/(1) at T, and the per-
son(1) at T exists at no time other than T and hence cannot be numerically identi-
cal to anything earlier or later than T. Talk of the numerical identity of pcrsons(2) 
over time is entirely chimerical. Memories occur only in worlds in which earlier 
beings are numerically identical to later ones. Responsibility obtains only in 
worlds in which earlier beings are numerically identical to later beings. If we are 
nothing but MPBs, we have no memories and we are responsible for nothing. 
Since it is far clearer that we have memories and are responsible for our actions 
than that there is any reason whatever to think that we are nothing but MPBs, 
we are not merely MPBs. Had Hume's argument against robust substances suc-
ceeded, perhaps we would have to accept that there are no memories or respon-
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sibilities; but it did not succeed. 
17. Even if we cannot find out the truth about Mary, it will not follow that 
there is no truth about her to be found. It is appropriate to wonder exactly what 
the transmission device did. Did it destroy Mary and make two Xerox copies? 
Did it clone Mary and send her to Venus and her clone to Cleveland? That we 
cannot tell which it did does not entail that it did not do one thing rather than 
another. 
18. I will ignore here what seems to me another necessary truth: no person 
can cease to exist and then exist again - i.e. it is logically impossible that there 
be retention of personal identity over time gaps. This assumes (what also seems 
to me true) that (a) persons are substances and are not essentially composite 
substances, and (b) no substance that is not essentially composite can exist over 
time gaps. The idea that substance dualism is "anti-biblical" is the product more 
of eisegesis than exegesis; d. John Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1989). 
